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Social Aspects of Transition
When it was finally realized in the 1980s that socialism, as a social order, was unable to provide
efficiency in development, especially not in the modified form of self-managing socialism, debates
were launched in Yugoslavia on abandoning it and establishing new social relations. Reform pro-
grams were drawn up by precisely those who had built the system that was to be changed. Can
anyone imagine a mother abandoning her mischievous child? She will endeavor to change him, but
will go soft and tolerate the resistance she knows to be of a genetic nature. Therefore, changes of
that type could be carried out only by those who had no emotional ties to the child called social-
ism, and whose bloodstream was made up of social property.
At the end of the 1980s, all socialist countries started changing the existing socialist system. The
same was done in Yugoslavia. The reform laws of 1989 and 1990 abolished self-management, but
not social property. Its disappearance was to be gradual. The guardians of socialism, i.e. of their
own positions, protected it, and it protected their positions and produced losses.
According to official statistics, in FR Yugoslavia without Kosovo-Metohija, the social product in
constant prices registered a drop by 54% in 1999 relative to 1990. However, Calculated in German
marks according to the market exchange rate, the nominal social product was down by 72%. The
average wage, also calculated in DM at the market exchange rate, was down n 1999 by 80%, and
the average pension down by 82%. The rate of open unemployment compared to the registered
labor force increased from 19.7% in 1990 to 27.3% in 1999, while the rate of surplus labor in social
and state companies grew from around 19.6% to some 58%. In 1999, the poverty rate among all
households amounted to 29.4%, and of non-agricultural households, predominantly living off
salaries and pensions, the poverty rate was 32.9%.
FRY a) 1999 1999 XII 2000 XII 2000 XII 2000 I-XII 2000
Basic Economic Indicators 1998 XI 2000 XII 1999 I-XII 1999
Industrial Production É -24.1% É -0.9% -8.6% 10.9%
Montenegro É -7.6% É -16.6% -16.6% 3.7%
Serbia É -25.6% É 0.3% -8.3% 11.4%
Central Serbia É -24.5% É 0.5% -13.6% 12.0%
Vojvodina É -28.2% É -0.1% 4.4% 10.1%
Average Wage - DM 107 -31.7% É É É É
Montenegro 154 -14.1% É É É É
Serbia 102 -33.8% 135 22.9% 55.6% -11.2%
Unemployment Rate b) 27.3% 8.3% 28.7% É É É
Montenegro 36.8% 7.9% 39.4% É É É
Serbia 26.5% 8.2% 27.9% É É É
Export - USD million 1,498 -46.9% 141 0.0% 14.7% 15.0%
Montenegro 123 -4.7% 4 -66.7% -34.7% 31.1%
Serbia 1,375 -48.9% 136 6.8% 17.7% 13.8%
Import - USD million 3,296 -30.3% 285 -4.3% -6.7% 12.6%
Montenegro 358 6.9% 13 -52.8% -36.3% -1.0%
Serbia 2,938 -33.2% 270 0.9% -3.5% 15.6%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, DIN billion 16.4 51.9% 31.3 17.3% 88.9% 61.7%
Cash 6.7 34.0% 11.5 26.3% 71.0% 41.6%
Deposits 9.7 67.2% 19.8 12.7% 101.1% 75.4%
Real money supply, end of period, DM million 739 -42.3% 1,043 17.3% 40.2% -26.3%
Market exchange rate, monthly level 4.25% -38.8% 6.80% -1.2% 74.8% 37.3%
Retail prices É 42.4% É 2.7% 113.3% 75.7%
Montenegro É 60.1% É ... ... ...
Serbia É 41.1% É 2.8% 111.9% 70.0%
Cost of living É 44.9% É 1.7% 115.3% 85.6%
Montenegro É 67.2% É ... ... ...
Serbia É 43.5% É 1.8% 115.3% 79.6%
Industrial prices É 44.2% É 6.8% 142.5% 106.5%
Montenegro É 63.7% É É É É
Serbia É 43.2% É 7.3% 143.9% 102.6%
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12.6 88.1% 30.00 0.0% 48.9% 103.2%
a) GDP for 1999 was 14,224 million USD, GDP per capita was 1,699 USD, GDP annual growth rate in 1999 was -19.3%, GDP annual growth per capita in 1999 was -19.1% (G17
estimate based on official data of the Federal Statistics Bureau).
b)  Unemployment rate refers to November.
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Opponents claim that this transitional period, which we must go through in order to achieve an effi-
cient economy without which there is no improvement in the standard of living, is too hard and too
painful. However, can anything be more painful than the fact: (1) that most of the citizens have reached
the poverty line; (2) that it is impossible for many to obtain employment in a regular and legal manner;
(3) that staying at work with monthly earnings sufficient to satisfy no more than the daily needs in liv-
ing-nutrition of a four-member family is below the dignity of contemporary man; (4) that salaries, pen-
sions, social and other transfers are usually several months overdue; (5) that accumulated expenses stim-
ulate price growth and constantly threaten to cause instability; (6) that the irresponsible attitude of the
former regime to the citizensÕ legal rights is shameful; (7) that living by oneÕs wits in order to survive has
reached its culmination; (8) that, on top of all this, a significant minority comprised of leading figures in
the former regime is enjoying the wealth they acquired often through robbery and malfeasance.
Quick Change of the Social System 
The transition from an authoritarian to a democratic social system in Yugoslavia was carried out rel-
atively quickly and, for many, unexpectedly. The former regime is not even aware of the extent to
which it had contributed to this itself. The break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the international com-
munityÕs sanctions, the production of one of the most devastating hyper-inflations in world economic
history, the draining of capital from the economy and banks through gray channels in order to place it
in personal pockets, and agreeing to NATOÕs bombardment, were all extremely strong reasons for cit-
izens to turn their back on the Leader and his yes-men. Major events and a sufficiently long period of
time, for present-day circumstances, over which they keep happening, unnoticeably, one would say,
changed the mood of the Yugoslav citizens. The realization of the fact that they deserve a better and
richer life was their guiding star. They felt the desire to feel happiness instead of the sorrow and pain
inflicted on them by the wars in the region, the arrival of relatives and friends from war-torn regions
who were left without their homes, and often without their dear ones as well, a scarcity of medical
treatment, and NATO bombs.
During all these years the Yugoslavs have actually been in a so-called transitional shock. They
touched the bottom of the transitional period already at the time of hyper-inflation. It was very difficult
to renounce the services of oneÕs old automobile, to ask a better-off colleague to drive you home for flour,
potatoes, beans, sugar, sometimes meat and a bag of detergent provided by the trade union, to chase
street hard currency dealers in the evening hours when salaries were usually paid out, so as to convert
this measly portion of a salary into DM so that its value would not be halved by the following morning,
to ride to work in a bus with a hole in the floor and in fear that it would overturn due to excessive weight.
At the time the Leader kept telling us that all our troubles were coming from outside, that the world was
to blame for this, and not he and his cronies who were living comfortable lives in their villas. Already
then, the citizens did not believe him, but they were patient. They left room for the last chance.
Being at the bottom for a few more years definitely convinced the citizens that they would have to
seek their own salvation. They made their first and most difficult step at the September elections. They
voted for changes convinced that no shocks greater than the ones they had experienced over the previ-
ous ten years could befall them. Also, they convinced themselves that true reforms could be carried out
only by new people.
Specificity of the Yugoslav Transition
As with all country cases, the context of Yugoslav transition is specific. The social aspect of the
Yugoslav transition is also specific. A large majority of the citizens is readily awaiting changes. Many know
what it means not to receive their salary, childrenÕs allowances or social welfare for a number of months,
not to receive oneÕs pension within the course of a month or possibly to receive only half of it, in viola-
tion of the law. To be formally employed, but actually unemployed with earnings that are much smaller
than the payment that would be received following dismissal from work — this has been our reality for
years. Relatively frequent murders, personal insecurity, various types of deception and robbery, all this is
already well known. Few countries in transition have experienced greater shocks.
Under the present Constitution, social issues fall under the jurisdiction of the republics. The ball is,
therefore, in the new Serbian governmentÕs court. The new federal authorities have already created the
main preconditions for the successful resolution of social problems in the period of transition. First of all,
they have ensured the arrival of donations promised by the international community.  This will ease will
ease the budget difficulties forecasted to arise in 2001 due to the settlement of a part of the debts to cit-
izens, initial efforts at renewal of the educational health care, social and judicial infrastructures, as well
as a modernization of the state administration, and the assistance that is to be offered to state infrastruc-
ture companies until they restructure and achieve a satisfactory level of efficiency in their work. The
obtainment of credits from international financial institutions for structural adjustment will also make a
major contribution to bridging revenue shortfalls in the next year.
However, donor aid and credits are not sufficient. A change of legal regulations is essential. The new
laws are to create a market environment for an entrepreneurial spirit, and to provide for the security of
private property and contracts. This is the main precondition for the effectiveness of all investments, the
inflow of direct foreign investments which will make possible the generation new jobs, the true employ-
ment of our workers, an increase in the real social product and salaries. A larger number of employees
and a higher level of salaries will also provide for a larger inflow of revenue to the state coffer, i.e. the
budget, which is essential for the successful resolution of all social issues. It is the state that needs to
resolve this — to pass adequate laws and comply with the citizensÕ social rights in line with the law.
Companies must be relieved of the social function.
Transition to a market economy requires a new social policy. It must be directed towards the pro-
tection of the work-able population and the development of an efficient social security system.
The new Serbian government must be resolute in carrying out what has been promised. It must live
up to the citizensÕ expectations and speedily resolve the problems, both those inherited from the previ-
ous regime, and those brought about by transition.
Transition is worth
the short-term pain
Citizens cast
unbending votes 
for change in
September
Donor aid fills the
revenue gap, but
legal reform is key
to the long-term
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How the Reforms Have Started Off
Following the recent change of power, the time came for implementing comprehensive reforms.
Monetary reform was the fastest to ensue. With amendments to the Law on the National Bank of
Yugoslavia, the BankÕs governor gained independence from other state bodies and was granted full autho-
rization to quantify domestic money and control commercial banking. His position was especially strength-
ened by the altered competencies of the federal government. The law stripped the government of its right
to set the dinarÕs exchange rate. Instead, the government merely established the regime of the dinarÕs
exchange rate, opting for hard currency exchange rates on the basis of market principles.
The governor appoints the vice-governors and their position is that of his aides. The Council of
Governors, which once even dismissed the governor himself, no longer exists. It was the federal constitu-
tional court that first contested the existence of this body and the amendments to the law have now pro-
vided for its abolition. Thus, with the broadening of the governorÕs competencies, the fate of the dinar has
finally been placed in his hands. This puts an end to the idea of a "currency board" as an efficient method
of self-regulation and the quick acquisition of quality domestic money.
There will also be no direct use of foreign money, as is the case in Montenegro and Kosovo. The inten-
tion is, however, to reintegrate these spaces into a single monetary system. Thus, to work on creating a
quality dinar actually means laying the foundations for a better economic system without which there is
no recovery for the devastated economy. It is only with a quality dinar that the National Bank of Yugoslavia
can justify what it stands for.
Foreign Currency Payments 
Counter to the advocated "currency board", and, above all, the direct use of foreign currency, the ban
on the use of foreign currency in payment operations in the country has remained in place. Also main-
tained are all the penalties for those who do not abide by these regulations. It is still often impossible to
purchase real estate and automobiles or to perform numerous other transactions without using foreign
currency. Further, a considerable part of the payment operations are carried out with the use of foreign
money. It is a stable dinar that should change all this, but this takes time. Until then, transgressions will
continue, be they penalized or not, until conditions exist for quality domestic money to render the use
of foreign money superfluous.
With this in mind, it is strange that the amendment to the Law on hard currency operations aban-
doned nominalism and legalized the setting of prices in relation to the value of hard currency or gold.
This is justified only in the case of bad money. If there was faith in the altered money concept of the
dinar and if it prevailed over the "currency board" and the direct use of foreign currency as domestic
money, then there was no reason to abandon nominalism and legalize the currency and gold clause. This
gives rise to doubt regarding the sustainability of nominalism, and will be only one of the obstacles faced
by those seeking the domestic moneyÕs stabilization.
Fully armed with competencies, governor Dinki, nevertheless, did retain an old custom and set his
monetary policy goals for this year. They tare quite ambitious and boil down to speedy stabilization. The
growth rate of average retail prices is planned to drop below one percent per month, aggregating to less
than 12.7 percent annually. Moreover, without the price growth effect caused by the liberalization of
prices, the goal is an annual retail price growth rate of up to 10 percent. Compared to last yearÕs 114 per-
cent inflation, this would be a great success. In order for it to be achieved, monetary policy must be con-
ducted with a firm hand. Further, price liberalization is necessary; there is no such thing as rampant or
quiet liberalization. It is only with liberalized prices that stabilization is possible.
Revealing his more specific intentions, the governor no longer resorted to any anticipation of money
supply trends, but rather stated the future amounts of the "National BankÕs net domestic assets" or "pri-
mary money". Unlike money supply, i.e. a well-defined M1, which includes cash and deposits of the non-
banking sector, this other less precise term implies, apart from cash, also the deposits of banks and state
accounts in the central bank.
Article 36 of the Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia stipulates that it is the federal state and its
member republics that are to keep sight deposits in the central bank. This is not really the case in prac-
tice, and the reasons for such a concept are not quite clear. One should also consider the possibility of the
fisc keeping sight deposits in commercial banks. In that event, payments between the fisc and the rest of
the non-banking sector would no longer directly affect the money supply size, the potentials for bank loans
would be greater, and the multiplicator of credits through deposits would set in.
Strong Monetary Restraints  
Mr. Dinki has committed himself to not increase primary money in the first quarter of the year by
more than 500 million dinars. With the multiplication of deposits through credits, primary money growth
generates a considerably larger money supply. Thus, at the end of October, for which we have available
data, the money supply was 1.575 times larger than primary money. It would, therefore, be more practi-
cal to reintroduce the notion of money supply in monetary planning. At the end of October it totaled to
23.0 billion dinars, only to grow to 31.3 billion dinars by the end of the last year. Therefore, strong mon-
etary restraints are envisaged.
Also praiseworthy is the announced regular publication of monetary statistics. We have thus learned
that cash accounted for an average 31.5 percent of the money supply in December, while this share grew
to 34.6 percent at the end of the year. It is obviously necessary to recognize interests in the projection of
achievable useful solutions.
We all know that the use of cash costs nothing. On the other hand, payments with giro money are
burdened by a service tax and three other fees, which total to 0.6 percent of each payment. Also present
is short weighing in the calculation of a larger percentage. Banks usually pay no interest on sight deposits.
This makes cash much better money than giro money. A more favorable treatment of giro money is an
Measure of money
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essential step to renew cashless payments, and the banishment of cash shatters the black market. In any
case, the mentioned fees must be abolished as soon as possible.
Fear for the success of the quantitative dosage of dinars in circulation remains due to the meager mon-
etary and credit instruments. The projection is for dinars to be quantified by the sale of hard currency and
the purchase of securities. The inflow of hard currency can easily result in excessive emission, which was
the case with the inflow resulting from the sale of the Telecom. In conditions of the dinarÕs easy conver-
sion into hard currency and a liberal import regime, a greater demand for dinars can be quickly met even
without an increase in prices through enlarged imports. But we have yet to achieve these two important
conditions. Until then we need to avoid a dinar emission which must be checked by the annulment of
money. The dinarÕs exchange rate can be of assistance in this regard.
The emitted surplus dinars are to be annulled by the sale of the National BankÕs securities to com-
mercial banks and the banksÕ stepped up credit payments to the central bank. For now, the all but non-
existence of a securities market narrows the possibilities for transactions on the open market. So, to reduce
the amount of money in circulation there remains the possibility of compelling commercial banks to pur-
chase the central bankÕs bonds. Even less likely is to accelerate credit repayment on the part of banks.
Distorted Motives and Interests  
The banking sector is, for the most part, still largely owned by state and social companies. This leads
to a distortion of motives and interests. The withdrawal of cash from the non-banking sector through the
sale of securities has still not begun. The ability of bad banks to repay credits is low even in conditions
of money expansion, while the enlargement of the mandatory reserves has long since proved unable to
withdraw money from circulation. It only resulted in the reduced liquidity of banks, with broader nega-
tive repercussions.
Mr. DinkiÕs announcement on the expanded use of interest rates in the dinarÕs quantitative regula-
tion is encouraging. Interest rates will be formed on the basis of market principles, but also on the cen-
tral bankÕs ability to influence the offer and demand for credits. The two will frequently take opposite
directions. And even more importantly, for both operations on the open market and for the use of inter-
est rates as a monetary-credit instrument, it is necessary to have a financial market and bonds, something
that is not even in its inception yet. It is only after the privatization of social and state capital that we will
have players on this market and conditions to influence interest rates on the basis of market principles.
Also projected is the coordination of the discount rate with trends of the interest rate level, even
though a reverse effect should not be neglected either. Neither of the two function at present. The dis-
count rate for January is set at 2 percent per month. Market interest rates are still higher, at 6.5 percent
per month and more. Notably, the credit interest rate has dropped slightly as inflation, which stood at 2.9
percent in December, moderates and the hard currency exchange rates stabilize. The guided-fluctuating
exchange rate of the dinar will also make it possible for the world credit market to have a beneficial
impact on domestic credit terms.
Unified Hard Currency Market 
The Law on hard currency operations does not provide for radical changes. The ultimate deadline for
the realization of imports has been extended from one to two months from the day of the payment.
Domestic banks have been allowed to grant hard currency credits for the imports of equipment and spare
parts. The operations of the National Bank of Yugoslavia via the Institute of Accounting and Payments
have been broadened to include money exchange operations. Such operations can also be conducted by
other exchange bureaus owned by legal entities and physical persons with whom the central bank con-
cludes contracts. The Law on foreign credit relations has still not been amended, even though this is of
great urgency. The entire sphere of foreign monetary relations should be innovated and placed in the
function of linking the domestic economy to the world economy.
According to the federal governmentÕs decision, the dinarÕs exchange rate is to be set against the
German mark, based on the offer and demand on the unified hard currency market. Its motion from the
exchange rate of the previous day is limited exclusively to the range set by the National Bank. This range
is still not known. The proper cross-application of the German markÕs exchange rate produces the
exchange rates of other currencies, and exchange rates established in such a manner are applied to all
hard currency transactions.
The federal governmentÕs Decree setting the conditions and manner in which the unified hard curren-
cy market is to operate is not in harmony with this. It is practically a word-for-word copy of the old reg-
ulation and, according to it, the middle exchange rates for each currency used in trade are calculated on
the basis of overall purchase and sale on the hard currency market. The purchase rate is obtained when
the middle exchange rate is deducted by 2.5 percent, and the selling hard currency rate when 2.5 percent
is added to it. The governor determines the extent to which the purchase and selling exchange rates will
differ from the middle rate. The other exchange rates are established through cross-application. The devi-
ation of the purchase and selling exchange rates from the middle rate has so far been only 0.3 percent.
The inter-bank market in Belgrade is still formed by banks through contracts, but all the banks with
current accounts abroad must be its members. Purchase on the hard currency market is performed
promptly, with dinar payments made within two daysÕ time. Hard currency trading in futures will be pos-
sible between banks themselves, as well as banks and other persons, with the agreed on exchange rate
being able to deviate from the prompt one by no more than the difference between interest rates on the
domestic market and the market of the currency being traded with. With the maintenance of such a rigid-
ly set exchange rate, trading in futures will probably still not be possible. This is a pity, as a well-regu-
lated futures market would be a useful stabilizing factor.
Before participating in the hard currency market, a bank is still obliged to present to the National
Bank data on its hard currency standing (its foreign currency assets, expected inflows, outflows and lia-
bilities) with a specification of the necessary hard currency outflow. On the hard currency market, the
agreed on exchange rate can range between the purchase and selling rates. Sales are performed through
a sales agreement. Another new form has also been introduced.
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The established and published hard currency exchange rates must be used for all the transactions
banks perform with the non-banking sector. The published hard currency exchange rates are not used
for foreign cash, checks, letters of credit and postal orders, but it remains unclear which exchange rates
will be applied and how they will be set. The Institute of Accounting and Payments is currently per-
forming money exchange operations and it is once again being afforded certain old competencies. Thus,
it was just recently entrusted with controlling the accounting and payments of the special federal tax. The
transfer of payments to commercial banks has been postponed for a year. The shift is eagerly awaited.  It
is time to cease moving in the dark.
Stock Market and Hard Currency Trade 
The weakness of the former and now renewed hard currency market can once again be demonstrat-
ed through excessive reliance on weak banks. Well-argued ideas for the stock market to be included in
hard currency trading have been abandoned. We have still not been acquainted with the margins of the
fluctuating exchange rate, so there remains the fear of the hard currency market once again staggering at
the base, since the exchange rate is formed at the top. Faith in the dinarÕs convertibility should be wide-
spread among the citizens and economic subjects. A hard currency exchange rate that would be imposed
on banks on the inter-bank market would once again suspend the supply of the economy and citizens
with hard currency. The defense of a non-balance dinar exchange rate with the sale of hard currency
reserves is not long-lasting, even though the central bankÕs current reserves of over half a billion dollars
and the additional USD 400 million on bank accounts, are quite certainly encouraging. But we have also
to settle the large foreign debt even before we establish equilibrium in the domestic economy.
In the future the governor must give his consent, not merely his opinion, to the appointment of the
directors of commercial banks. This can contribute to better staffing. However, even greater problems for
banks are found in their balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements. At the end of last October, the
losses of banks in Serbia reached the figure of 4.3 billion dinars. Losses could be larger after hard cur-
rency liabilities are entered according to the real exchange rate, while numerous claims can quite cer-
tainly not be collected, thus incurring new losses. The governorÕs haste to launch the rehabilitation, con-
solidation, or termination of banks should be hailed. If he truly categorizes them by the end of January
into a) those that need no interventions, b) those in need of additional capitalization, c) those that are
insolvent and require consolidation or d) those whose license will be revoked, he will have achieved a
great deal. If the inclusion of foreign banks into the domestic banking system is initiated alongside with
this, we can begin regaining optimism and hope for the development of the domestic financial market.
Somewhat in discrepancy with the governorÕs intentions and acts is the anticipated plan of the
National Bank of Yugoslavia for this year. It envisages that the central bankÕs total revenues and expen-
ditures stand at 10.1 billion dinars. This represents an increase of 173 percent compared to the 3.7 billion
dinars planned for the previous year. The interest yielded by the enlarged hard currency reserves will
bring in revenues, but interest will be paid on the average monthly hard currency reserves deposited in
the central bank by banks authorized to conduct foreign business operations, and which are set at USD
4 million, i.e. USD 2 million, depending on the banksÕ authorization. Moreover, it would be good to
change the legal regulation according to which the excess profits above the central banks expenditures
are considered federal budget revenues, just as it would also be useful to revise the provisions on this
bankÕs credit financing of the state.
Openness to Trade with the World 
The countryÕs openness to trade with the world is closely connected with the dinarÕs convertibility
and stabilization. The changes that facilitate and simplify trade should be hailed, but significant changes
are lacking. The import of used vehicles and certain machines has been facilitated, and the possibility of
importing goods into the country has been expanded, but the quotas and permits remain in place.
Persons involved in foreign trade no longer have to register with the ministry to keep a useless deposit
of 10,000 German marks. An even greater facilitation is the abolition of the need to report a concluded
foreign trade deal, which was replaced by book-keeping on the part of the participants. The use of quo-
tas is also no longer registered with the ministry. 
Monetary management must be harmonized with the fiscal policy, but this sphere is not off to a good
start. The law on a special federal tax on the sale of products and services for 2001 represents an exten-
sion of this temporary tax. Moreover, it has even been enlarged. The tax on purchased working equip-
ment and agricultural machinery is 1% instead of the previous 0.6%. The tax on consumption products,
on which the sales tax is paid at a lower rate, and on services has been increased from 2 percent to 3
percent, while for the products on which the sales tax is paid at a higher rate, the tax for this year stands
at 5%, instead of the previous 4%.
The introduction of this tax is a mistake in many ways. The federal constitution affords the federal
state only the right to adopt a law on the basics of the fiscal system, and not to levy taxes. This produces
an even greater collision of fiscal competencies.
The mentioned law has also laid the foundations of taxes, but they do not include the special feder-
al tax on the sale of products and services. And why should there be several sales taxes anyway? Under
the Law on the basics of the fiscal system, the sales tax rates are 9 and 20 percent, and with this addi-
tional sales tax they mount in Belgrade to nearly a third of the price. The Institute of Accounting and
Payments has been engaged to control the accounting and payments of the federal tax, so we have thus
acquired a fourth institution for the collection of public revenues (two republican institutions, the cus-
toms service and this new one), which is not rational. This tax will quite certainly not be collected in
Montenegro.
The increase in the sales tax does not provide for the promised reduction of taxes and duties and the
lowering of public spending, which lies at the core of the necessary reforms. The federal budget for this
year is set at 45.9 billion dinars, or 104 percent more than last yearÕs budget. The mentioned new tax is
to bring in almost a quarter of the revenues. It remains to be seen if the Serbian budget will be smaller,
its sales tax reduced, of the timing of reforms to the fiscal system start off. Together with a speedy and
effective privatization — they form the backbones of the necessary reforms.
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Prices and Wages
Monthly retail price inflation in Serbia was 2.8% in December, while the costs of living increased by
1.8%. This confirms forecasts of relative price stabilization following two-digit monthly rates in the previ-
ous two months. The annual retail price inflation was 111.9% in Serbia (FRY — 122.7%), while the costs
of living grew by 115.3% (FRY — 115.4%) in the same period. Producers in Serbia raised their prices in
December by 7.3%. Compared to 2000, the largest
increase was recorded in the prices of tobacco,
66.2%, and beverages, 301%. The annual growth
rate of the prices of agricultural products in the
FRY was 142.5%, while the index of wholesale
prices of industrial products was 147.7%. The
prices of agricultural products registered a drop in
December relative to the preceding month. If we
compare the 2000 average with the 1999 average,
the largest increase was in the prices of agricul-
tural products, up 103.3%, and industrial products,
up 82.5%.
Net wages in December (4,061 dinars) com-
pared to those in November 2000 recorded a
nominal increase of 23%, while the growth of
nominal wages in November compared to
October was 13%. Expressed in German marks,
December wages are worth 135 DEM, or 23%
more than in November. Real purchasing power
(nominal wages deflationed by the cost of living
index) grew by 21% in December. Compared to
the same month of 1999 (expressed in DEM), the
average wage is up by 55.6%. This favorable picture is conditioned by the fact that the annual nominal
exchange rate growth was only 42.8%, which is a large difference compared to the mentioned inflation
rates. The expected December rise in wages improved this yearÕs wage average. The average wage for
2000 was 93 DEM, which is the result of a considerable real wage increase in the last three months of the
year, in view of the fact that the average monthly wage ranged between 75 DEM and 90 DEM during the
first nine months of 2000.
The populationÕs total money earnings were worth 234.6 billion dinars, of which net wages account-
ed for 56.2 billion and pensions for 35.9 billion.
Output 
Industrial output in the FRY in December 2000 dropped by 0.9 percent compared to the preceding
month. In Montenegro, the output was down by 16.6%, while it increased in Serbia by 0.3%. In Central
Serbia, output grew 0.5%, while in Vojvodina output registered a drop of 0.1%. Output was higher in 16
sectors — from 1.3% (the production of oil and gas) to 119.4% (the manufacture of various products), while
it dropped in 19 branches, from 3.4% (the production of leather footwear and fine leather goods) to 83.1%
(the extraction of iron ore). The deseasonalized index for December shows a 2.1% drop relative to
November. Industrial output in the FRY in December 2000 was down by 8.6% compared to the same
month of the preceding year when the impact of seasonal factors was the same. Output dropped in
Montenegro by 16.6%, and in Serbia by 8.3%. The output drop in Central Serbia was 13.6%, while
Vojvodina registered an increase of 4.4%. Compared to the preceding month, output grew in 12 branch-
es — from 2.8% (coal extraction) to 91.2% (the manufacture of oil products), while a drop was recorded
in all other branches, ranging between 1.5% (metal processing) and 98.3% (extraction of iron ore).
Industrial output in the FRY in 2000 is up by 10.9% relative to 1999. Output growth in Montenegro was
3.7%, and 11.4% in Serbia. Output increased in Central Serbia by 12.0%, and in Vojvodina by 10.1%. Six
branches recorded a drop in output — from 1.4% (the manufacture of food products) to 4.7% (extraction
of iron ore), while output increased in all the other branches, from 0.3% (shipbuilding) to 153.5% (fer-
rous metallurgy). Industrial output in the FRY in December 2000 dropped by 70.8% compared to
December 1989, and fell by 70.2% in 2000 relative to 1989.
Foreign trade
Total FRY imports in 2000 were worth USD 3.662 billion, while total exports accounted for USD
1.713 billion. The overall trade deficit in 2000 was USD 1.949 billion. Compared to the 12 months of
1999, exports increased by 15%, and imports were up by 12.6%. For the 12 months of 2000, the export-
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import ratio was 46%. Exports remained unchanged in December compared to the preceding month,
totaling to USD 141 million, while imports dropped by 4.3%, to USD 285 million. The export-import
ratio in November was 49.4%.
In December, Serbia exported goods worth USD 136 million, and imported goods with a total value
of USD 233 million. Compared to November 2000, exports and imports registered an increase by 6.8%
and 0.9%. Relative to December 1999, exports
increased by 17.7%, while imports dropped by
3.5%. SerbiaÕs total imports in 2000 were worth USD
3.035 billion, while total exports totaled to USD
1.411 billion. The overall foreign trade deficit was
USD 1.624 billion.
The FRYÕs main export partners were: Bosnia-
Herzegovina (with Republika Srpska) 14.7%, Italy
12.9% and Germany 10.2%. The top countries FRY
imported from were: Germany 12.9%, Italy 10.5%,
Russia 8.6% and Bulgaria 8.7%. The FRY has a pos-
itive balance only with BiH and Macedonia. It has
the largest trade deficits with Germany (USD 302
million), Russia (USD 233 million) and Bulgaria
(USD 167 million). Compared to 1999, the FRYÕs
exports to BiH dropped by 16% and imports from
BiH were reduced by 6.6%, while for Germany a
rise was registered in both exports (41.6%) and
imports (17.1%). From the ten countries to which
FRY exports were the largest, it is interesting that
exports to Cyprus increased by 177% relative to 1999, while among the ten countries from which FRY
imported the most, imports from Bulgaria registered a rise of 117% relative to 1999.
Regarding the structure of foreign trade by products, FRYÕs main exports in 2000 were aluminum
(7.4%), raspberries (3.6%), beech wood (2.4%) and medicine for retail trade (2.3%). The main imports
were of diesel oil (6.3%), gasoline (5.7%), motor vehicles (3.2%) and natural gas (2.1%). Compared to
1999, aluminum exports increased by 57.1%, and medicine for retail trade was up by 38.9%. Imports of
diesel oil grew by 79.4% relative to 1999.
Money, Public Revenues and Expenditures 
The period of remonetization continued in the course of December. The M1 money aggregate
totaled to 31.3 billion dinars, i.e. 1,043 million DEM. An exceptionally high monthly growth was regis-
tered in the real and nominal money supply by as much as 17.3%. Primary emission was resorted to
exclusively on the basis of hard currency transactions.
December will be remembered by oscillations within the M1 aggregate. Following October, the
share of cash in the M1 aggregate initially drop-ped from 38% to around 30%. The obvious intention
of these measures was to
reduce the possibility of
tax evasion with the use
of cash. Public revenues
collected in December
nominally increased by
59.18% compared to
November, and account-
ed for 23.4 billion dinars.
At the end of December,
the usual change in favor
of cash took place, so
that the initial ratio was
more or less restored.
The M2 money aggregate
totaled to 36.7 billion
dinars.
A problem is still the exceptionally high market interest rate (the weighted rate on commercial and
treasury bonds and certificate of deposits) of 6.8%. This level represents a serious obstacle to the bet-
ter use of capacities and an increase in exports, i.e. short-term capital drives money away from the cred-
it financing of production. At monthly inflation levels between 1 and 2%, this is an exceptionally high
real interest rate, which renders the purchase of short-term commercial bonds extremely profitable, at
a high risk. At issue is a veritable moral hazard in which certain stock market brokers and issuers of
commercial bonds participate.
Total nominal public revenues in 1999 were worth 139.6 billion dinars, out of which budgetary rev-
enues accounted for 89.8 billion, and revenues of social security organizations (funds) were 49.7 bil-
lion. One should also take into account the extremely high level of off-balance items, whereby the
share of public revenues in the social product is considerably higher.
In the structure of public revenues, taxes account for 51.3% (taxes on the sale of goods and ser-
vices and excises account for 32%, the property tax 1.4%, profit tax 17.9% - of which the share of the
income tax is almost 92%, and of the corporate income tax only 8%); customs duties account for 9.1%,
and fees for 17%, while the rest are other budgetary revenues.
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